From May to July 1995, a serologic and interview survey was conducted to describe Ebola hemorrhagic fever (EHF) among personnel working in 5 hospitals and 26 health care centers in and around Kikwit, Democratic Republic of the Congo. Job-specific attack rates estimated for Kikwit General Hospital, the epicenter of the EHF epidemic, were 31% for physicians, 11% for technicians/room attendants, 10% for nurses, and 4% for other workers. Among 402 workers who did not meet the EHF case definition, 12 had borderline positive antibody test results; subsequent specimens from 4 of these tested negative. Although an old infection with persistent Ebola antibody production or a recent atypical or asymptomatic infection cannot be ruled out, if they occur at all, they appear to be rare. This survey demonstrated that opportunities for transmission of Ebola virus to personnel in health facilities existed in Kikwit because blood and body fluid precautions were not being universally followed.
Since first described in 1976, Ebola (EBO) hemorrhagic fe-

Materials and Methods ver (EHF) has been characterized by its high case fatality and
Subjects and sample collection. From May to July 1995 (at human-to-human transmission. The three early EHF outbreaks the height of the EHF epidemic in Kikwit), we conducted a survey in Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Sudan in of health care workers and other personnel from Kikwit General 1976 and 1979 [1 -3] and the most recent in DRC in 1995 Hospital, the epicenter of the EHF epidemic, four other hospitals (including one maternity hospital), and 26 health care centers in [4] have shown a pattern of amplification through nosocomial (25%) of the 315 patients meeting the case definition for EHF Information collected on the questionnaire included the subject's [5] . To investigate the occurrence of asymptomatic or atypical age, sex, work location (hospital, branch, or unit), type of work, forms of EHF among this highly exposed group and to increase recent health history (including disease with fever and hemorrhagic the completeness of EHF surveillance, we conducted a serosigns), possible contact with EHF patients or with body fluids or secretions from suspected EHF patients in health care or home logic and interview survey among personnel working in hospisettings, and nature of this contact. For a subset of workers from tals and health care centers in Kikwit and surrounding towns.
Kikwit General Hospital, more detailed information was obtained regarding occupational exposures and precautions taken to prevent spread of infection.
Blood specimens were obtained from the participants by veni- above paragraph) with EHF or suspected EHF patients. The following information describes personal hygiene after contact with these patients (n indicates the denominator for the percentResults ages, excluding those with missing information): For 74% of contacts (n Å 147), the respondent reported washing his or At Kikwit General Hospital, 37 of the 429 workers on the personnel list met the case definition for EHF, for an overall her hands following contact, but the hand washing occurred immediately following contact for only 21% (n Å 132), disinattack rate of 9%. The attack rate was 31% (4/13) for physicians, 10% (22/212) for nurses, 11% (7/62) for technicians/ fectant was used for hand washing by 16%, disinfectant plus soap and water were used by 10%, and water and soap only room attendants, and 4% (4/111) for other workers. These Kikwit General Hospital employees and employees of other were used by 74% (n Å 120). For 76 of the 151 contacts, dates for the period during which contact occurred were available; health care facilities who met the case definition were excluded from our survey.
all 76 contacts occurred prior to arrival of the international epidemic response team in Kikwit. Of the 75 contacts for whom Completed questionnaires and blood specimens were obtained from 402 persons, 168 women (42%) and 233 men information was available, 18 (24%) used complete protection (gloves, gown, mask, goggles) during the contact; 6 (8%) used (58%); the sex was not recorded for 1 person. One-third of the participants were working in a clinic or health center at the only gloves; the remaining 24 (32%) used neither gloves nor complete protection. time of the interview, and 70% were working in a hospital. In table 1, participants are classified by job, according to their None of the 402 persons interviewed had any signs or symptoms suggestive of EHF at the time of the interview; however, contact with patients and site of employment. Direct-contact jobs included those involving attending patients (nurses, physi-129 recalled having been sick in the 3 months prior to the interview, and for 2 of them, the illness involved fever and cians, medical and nursing students, and room attendants), removing and burying of cadavers (Red Cross workers and attenhemorrhage. Both had negative EBO serologic test results. None of the other 400 specimens tested was strongly positive; dants), or collecting or processing clinical specimens (4) 22 (14) 14 ( (83) 1 (1) 18 (15) 2 (2) Total 278 (69) 9 (2) 99 (25) 16 (4) NOTE. Data are no. (row %).
Previous investigations have shown that EBO can easily however, 12 specimens were borderline positive at an IgG titer be transmitted by percutaneous exposure through unsterilized of 1:400, and all had a sum of ú1.25 for the adjusted optical needles, as in the Yambuku outbreak [1] and in laboratory densities for the 4 dilutions tested for IgG. Of these 12 workers, accidents [7] . Person-to-person spread from a clinically ill pa-1 was a cashier, 1 was an aide, 2 were room attendants, 4 were tient is facilitated by direct physical contact or contact with nurses, 1 was a secretary, 1 was a first aid worker, and 2 were blood, stool, or vomitus [8] . Our survey indicates that the opsecurity guards. The 12 participants with borderline positive portunities for exposure of workers at the health facilities in test results were not significantly different from the others Kikwit was high: 279 workers reported on-the-job contact with regarding patient contact job classification, reported on-the-job an EHF or suspected EHF patient (73% of workers with directcontact with EHF or suspected EHF patients, home contact, or contact jobs; 33% of those with indirect-contact jobs). It was any of the specific types of contact. A second specimen was somewhat surprising that as many as 64% of workers with jobs later collected for 4 of the 12 borderline positive participants.
unlikely to involve patient contact reported on-the-job exposure All 4 second specimens were negative for IgG.
to an EHF or suspected EHF patient. The fact that ''exposure'' was defined loosely (i.e., it included simply entering a patient's room) partly but not completely explained this finding. The Discussion only ''contact'' was entering the patient's room for 15 of 63 In earlier EHF epidemics, infections among health care (24%) participants who reported contact but who held jobs workers signaled an ongoing EHF epidemic or the potential unlikely to involve patient contact. It is also possible that refor one, and in 1995, this pattern held in Kikwit, where onesponse bias may partly explain this finding, or it may reflect fourth of all reported infections were among workers at health that personnel not usually in contact with patients were pressed care facilities. The highest attack rate among health care workinto service as the EHF case load increased (at Kikwit General ers in this epidemic was among physicians, with nearly oneHospital alone, 184 persons meeting the EHF case definition third of those working at Kikwit General Hospital having been were admitted during the epidemic) and as persons in directinfected. This high attack rate among physicians is evidence contact jobs themselves fell ill. of the disabling effect an EBO outbreak can have on the capac-A main goal of our infection survey was to investigate the occurrence of atypical or asymptomatic EHF resulting in deity to deliver health services. JID 1999; 179 (Suppl 1) Ebola Serologic Survey of Health Workers tectable antibody among health facility personnel not preThis further emphasizes the need to establish the routine practice of precautions to prevent exposure to blood and body fluids viously identified as having EHF. Twelve of those surveyed had blood specimens that tested borderline positive. However, in health care facilities, including the provision of sufficient supplies of protective gear, the continuance of training, and second specimens from 4 of the 12 subsequently tested negative. It is possible that results for the first specimens were false locally adapted quality assessment and improvement programs. positive or that these patients had atypical antibody responses [9] . Second specimens were not available for testing for the
